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Richard Fenno, in Power of the Purse, contends that the budget process responds
to interest group pressures. This study examines that hypothesis for 20 bureaus in
the Department of Agriculture for the fiscal years 1971-1976. Cultivating clientele
support both among interest groups and members of Congress appears to aid a
bureau’s budget position. Bureaus with strong support not only avoid budget cuts
but grow rapidly from year to year.
Since Truman’s (1951) seminal work, The Governmental
Process, interest groups have been central to the study of the
American policy-making process. Almost every study of
public policy ranging from studies of regulation to studies
of health care refers to interest groups and their role in shaping
public policy (Marmor, 1973; Kohlmeier, 1969; Thomas,
1975). Despite the emphasis on interest groups, there has been
little comparative and empirical study of the relative impact
that interest groups have in determining policy outputs.
AUTHORS’ NOTE: We would like to thartk John l~’anat, George Hale, Scutt
Dou,~lass, and Burt Wheeler for comme11ls on an earlier draft of this paper.
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The inattention can be explained by two methodological
problems. First, the events that concern policy analysts-the
passage of medicare, cigarette health warnings, technological
innovation in rail transportation, and the like-occur rarely;
they are usually major struggles that are open to public
scrutiny. Second, in these studies the goals of the interest
groups are usually not comparable. One group may be
attempting to prevent an issue from being placed on the
agenda, another might try to force passage of a law, a third
to restrict the scope of political conflict. When objectives
differ greatly, assessing the impact of interest groups becomes
extremely difficult.
One policy area with regular, reoccurring events and
comparable goals is the budgetary process. Since budgets are
an annual event and since the mechanisms of the budget reduce
all goals into monetary terms. budgeting is an ideal area to
assess the influence of interest groups. Also, the literature
on budgeting offers some specific hypotheses concerning the
impact of interest groups. Rourke ( 1976) notes that bureaus
placed (as most are) in an uncertain political environment
must attract interest group support to ensure their own
survival. Fenno (1966) relates this need for political support
directly to the budget process. Support among interest groups,
according to Fenno, is directly translatable into positive
action on bureau budgets. Members of Congress, to retain
their position of influence in the budgetary process, must
respond to interest groups because interest groups have
political resources and information members of Congress
need to perform adequately and remain in office.
Since Fenno’s classic study of the appropriations process,
two factors have changed suggesting that his findings should
be reexamined. First, the amount of uncontrollable spending
in the budget has grown substantially in the past decade
(Derthick, 1975). Uncontrollable expenditures are expendi-
tures that the government is committed to spend as a result
of past obligations and contracts; such spending cannot
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be controlled by the appropriations process in the short run.
U ncontrollables have increased because substantive com-
mittees of Congress have committed funds through the
authorization/ legislation process. For example, by increasing
social security payments Congress has committed resources
far into the future-such spending is uncontrollable in the
sense that the appropriations process cannot affect it. The
increase in uncontrollable expenditures means that much
of the discretionary power in the budgetary process has
shifted from the appropriations committees to the substantive
committees.
Second, the pattern of incremental decision-making has
broken down as a result of increased inflation and a shortage
of resources caused by the growth in uncontrollables. Accord-
ing to Gist ( 1976), the increase in federal revenues in the past
ten years has not been able to cover the normally expected
program growth. Funding all programs at the previous year’s
level with allowances for inflation totals a sum greater than
the estimated federal revenue for most years. As a result,
congressional scrutiny of agency budgets is increasingly
concerned with both an agency’s base as well as its requested
increment. Funding disputes, therefore, have become more
political and policy oriented. The presidential-congressional
disputes over the B-1 bomber, the bombing of Cambodia, the
Rural Environmental Assistance Program, pollution control
grants, and the like have all been fought within the budget
process.
In light of the changing circumstances, this paper will
reassess the impact that interest groups have on the budget
process at the federal level. First, a brief survey of the litera-
ture will reveal several important hypotheses about interest
groups and their role in the budget process. Second, a series
of new methods will be discussed for analyzing the impact
that interest groups have on the budget. Third, using data
from the 1971-1976 federal budgets, this paper will examine
whether bureaus that are successful in attracting interest
group support will also be successful in the budget process.
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THE LITERATURE ON BUDGETING
AND INTEREST GROUPS
In the literature on budgeting, the theoretical and empirical
work has been separated to a surprising extent.’ The two
major works providing theoretical statements about the
budgeting process do not provide more than intermittent
empirical support for their arguments. Conversely, most
empirical work on budgeting is limited in the nature of the
variables employed, especially as far as inclusion of outside
variables of a theoretically significant nature is concerned.
These studies concentrate on variables that describe the
process of budgeting itself and only consider influences
from the political world in an ad hoc manner. The impact of
interest groups has been completely ignored by this literature.
Wildavsky ( 1964), a leading authority on the politics of
budgeting, argues that interest group support is a crucial
factor for the success of a bureau in budgeting. Bureaus
mobilize their clientele to testify before congressional com-
mittees so that they can provide feedback on bureau per-
formance over the year. &dquo;When feedback is absent or limited,
Congressmen tend to assume no one cares, and they need not
bother with the appropriation&dquo; (Wildavsky, 1964: 68). An
agency desiring positive treatment by Congress, therefore,
attempts to persuade its clientele to actively support the
bureau in the budget process.
Fenno’s The Power of the Purse ( 1966), the other major
work emphasizing the political aspects of budgeting, also
stresses the impact of interest groups. Studying some 36
federal domestic bureaus over a time span of 16 years, Fenno
found that bureaus with strong environmental support (which
includes interest groups) were also the bureaus that had
rapidly growing budgets. Bureaus with strong support among
appropriations committee members, on the other hand, were
able to avoid budget cuts and get a larger portion of the
funds that they requested. Some agencies able to build both
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clientele support and congressional support grew rapidly and
avoided cuts in their request for funds. Fenno’s findings
are limited only by his failure to operationalize either environ-
mental or congressional support; his hypotheses were vali-
dated by citing examples.
Empirical studies of budgeting, in general, are more narrow
in range than Fenno’s and Wildavsky’s studies. They concen-
trate on variables internal to the budgeting process. Davis
et al. ( 1966) basically demonstrated the incremental nature
of budgeting using appropriations data. In a similar fashion
Wanat (1974) extended their work by explicitly taking the
agency’s base and increment into account as separate vari-
ables. He showed that an agency’s requested increment is
separable into a mandatory increase necessary to maintain
existing programs at their current level and a programmatic
increase necessary to fund the expansion in an agency’s
programs. A number of other studies were direct applications
of Fenno’s work to agencies not treated by him (Fox, 1971;
Knight, 1968; Thomas and Handberg, 1974) and of Davis et
al.’s ( 1971) models to different agencies or different types of
institutions (Hoole et al., 1976). None of these studies take
variables other than those directly reflecting the process of
budgeting into account.
Recently some empirical studies of budgeting have con-
sidered these so-called external variables. Davis et al. ( 1974)
demonstrated the effects of partisan control of the presidency
and Congress by including them into their model as dummy
variables. Sharkansky (1968), in a study of budgeting in
the states, related economic factors and gubernatorial power
to the making of state budgets. Gist ( 1976) attempted to
show that inflation and the increase in uncontrollable spend-
ing had changed the incremental nature of the budgetary
process, necessitating agencies to defend their base rather
than merely their requested increment.
This brief review of the literature reveals two things. First,
environmental influences, especially interest group support,
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are assumed to have a great deal of impact on budget outputs.
Most descriptions of the budget process refer to the need to
develop clientele support for a bureau. Second, no rigorous
study, with replicable measures of interest group support,
relating interest group support to budget outputs, has been
undertaken. This paper hopes to remedy that shortcoming by
providing both a measure of interest group support and
relating that interest group support to budget outputs.
METHODS
1. Dependerrt Variables. The two dependent variables in
this study, commonly used in all studies of budgeting, were
developed by Fenno (1966). First, the congressional growth
rate of a bureau is the percentage increase in an agency’s
budget over a number of years. By dividing this year’s con-
gressional appropriation by last year’s congressional appro-
priation, the growth rate for one year is found. This study
uses the average growth rate for the bureaus between FY 1971 1
and FY 1976.
The congressional success rate of a bureau relates the
bureau’s request for funds from Congress to the amount that
Congress actually grants. The success rate is the agency’s
request of Congress (as approved by the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget) divided into the actual congressional
appropriation for that year. This study uses the average
success rate for the bureaus between FY 1971 and FY 1976.
Fenno demonstrated that for his 36 bureaus, growth rates
and success rate are independent of each other. In the bureaus
used for this study (see below) high congressional growth
rates are positively correlated with high congressional success
rates.
The present variables differ slightly from those used by
Fenno; since he was concerned with the actions of the appro-
priations committee, he used the figures of the appropriations
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committee report rather than the final congressional budget
figures. Using only the figures from the appropriations
committee can be misleading. As Ferejohn (1974: 157), a
perceptive student of budgetary politics, states:
For some agencies the [appropriations] committee’s decisions
are effectively final for both the House and the Senate. For
other agencies the House goes along with committee rec-
ommendations but the Senate makes large changes. In the
case of still other agencies, the House makes substantial
changes through floor amendments after the appropriations
committee has submitted its recommendations.
Ferejohn’s study indicates that some bureaus (and some
interest groups, for that matter) have influence in the appro-
priations committees, others on the floor of the House, others
in Senate and House substantive committees, and others still
on the Senate floor. If bureaus have support in various
portions of Congress, then only the budget figures as they
are finally passed by Congress can assure one that the figures
reflect all possible influences of interest groups.
2. Independent Variables. Assessing the extent of clientele
support for a bureau is a difficult task. Even in a process as
well defined as the appropriations process, a bureau’s clientele
has a variety of points of access: the president, the OMB, the
department budget office, appropriations subcommittees, and
finally the floor of Congress. Unfortunately, the operations
of clientele groups in most of these arenas are obscured from
view. The only place where group support or opposition is
visible in the process is during the nondepartmental testimony
in the House and Senate appropriations subcommittees.
Whether or not the groups appearing at the subcommittee
hearings are representative of the bureau’s clientele support
is an empirical question. We believe, based on our knowledge
of the process and the studies of others, that it is for two
reasons. First, whether or not an agency has friends on sub-
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committees or elsewhere in the process, the subcommittee
hearings are perceived as an opportunity to demonstrate
that the bureau has public support (Wildavsky, 1964: 67).
Only an irrational bureau chief would rely on sub rosa contacts
that were not supplemented by an impressive public record of
group support. Second, an examination of the groups testify-
ing for and against the Agricultural Research Service shows
few major forces in agriculture missing-the large farm
associations, commodity organizations, elements of agri-
business, state organizations, and local farmers are all
present.2 2
The first variable gathered from subcommittee testimony
is the number of interest groups testifying for a bureau. Using
both the House and Senate appropriations subcommittees
on agriculture, the number of interest groups was counted
for the 1971 through 1976 fiscal years. The number of groups
testifying ranged from a low of zero for the National Agri-
cultural Library to 216 for the Agricultural Research Service.
According to Rourke ( 1976), mere quantity of clientele
support is only partly relevant. The best type of clientele
group for an agency to have is one that is intensely committed
to the bureau. Strong supporters are more likely to go to
greater lengths to support a bureau than lukewarm supporters.
The intensity of interest group support measure was derived
from a content analysis of the six years of appropriations
hearings by reading all the testimony for all agricultural
bureaus and coding the intensity of the support. Since this
is the first attempt to determine the intensity of interest
group support, the measure will be crude at best. Only as
additional research is focused on this problem can this
measure be adequately refined.
The coding of intensity of support is based on the assump-
tion that support for a bureau in general is evidence of a
stronger commitment by a group than support for a specific
program. The transitory nature of many agricultural programs
means that programmatic support for a bureau lasts only as
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long as the program-anywhere from a few years to decades.
General support for the bureau, although in all likelihood
based on programmatic support, indicates a stronger com-
mitment to the bureau. In line with this assumption, if a
witness testified for the bureau only, the testimony was
coded as a +3. Program support only was coded as +2. Both
program and bureau support was coded as +5. If the witness
favored the agency in general but opposed a single program,
the testimony was coded as +1. Support for a program coupled
with criticism of the agency was coded -I. Similar scores
were created for opposition to the bureau/programs with
negative scores assigned to such testimony.
The intensity of support variable is divided into two vari-
ables : first, a relatively simple variable, the percentage of
witnesses that testified favorably. In most cases groups appear
to compliment bureaus, not to criticize them. The average
agency received positive support from 81% of the groups
mentioning it. The second variable is the mean support score
of all clientele testifying on the bureau, based on the above
coding system. The average support score for the agriculture
bureaus was 1.98.
Since Fenno’s original study concerned the impact of
congressional support as well as the impact of interest group
support, a special variable was constructed out of con-
gressional testimony similar to the interest group testimony.
Measures were gathered for number of co»gres.sional test(fiers
(range 0 to 249, with mean 31) and the mean congressional
support score (mean for all agencies was 1.63) for all the
bureaus in this study.
Rourke indicates that some clientele characteristics make
them more attractive as bureau supporters. Although this
study cannot probe all the interesting hypotheses that Rourke
presents about the effect of size, cohesion, prestige, and
so on of a clientele, the effects of different types of wit-
nesses were examined. Witnesses before congressional sub-
committees on appropriations generally fall into four types:
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members of Congress, mass membership associations, peak
associations, and single petitioners. We can speculate that
some of these witnesses are more important in the budget
process than others. Members of Congress, because of the
norms of reciprocity, are likely to be the most important
for an agency (Rourke, 1976: 61). Next most influential
should be the mass associations-support from mass member-
ship associations demonstrates that the agency’s outputs are
used and appreciated by a large segment of the American
population. Peak associations, i.e., associations of associa-
tions, are likely to be less influential because they represent
fewer individuals. The Association of State Superintendents of
Instruction represents some 50 individuals, and government
institutions at that. We are not arguing that support from
peak associations is qualitatively different from that of mass
associations, only that mass associations can claim to rep-
resent a larger segment of the population than most peak
associations can. Finally, single petitioners, the single in-
dividuals that request special congressional action on a
project that affects them or their community, should be least
influential. Single petitioners should be important only to
the members of Congress representing the petitioner’s district.
3. The Unit of Analysis, The unit of analysis for this study
is 20 bureaus and agencies within the U.S. Department of
Agriculture.3 These particular bureaus were selected because
they met three characteristics. First, they comprise a limited
set of bureaus making the task of gathering data on interest
groups and appropriations manageable. The time necessary to
gather data similar to the present data for all similar-sized
bureaus in the federal government would be at least seven or
eight times as long. Second, these agencies are involved pri-
marily in distributive (Lowi, 1972) policy-making. Distrib-
utive policy is characterized by piecemeal, positive sum
politics. The policy is easily divisible into small tasks, each
of which can be granted without denying any of the others.
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TABLE 1
Number of Interest Groups Testifying and Budget Outputs
Ferejohn ( 1974: 193) argues that distributive policy is marked
by extensive interest group involvement. The agricultural
bureaus, therefore, are likely candidates for strong interest
group support and the translation of that support into budget
outputs. Third, all of the bureaus operate in the same func-
tional area. This means that the requests the bureaus make
on the subcommittees will be similar and, thus, comparable
more than in just strict monetary terms. Operating in the same
functional area means also that these bureaus will all seek
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TABLE 2
Percent of Groups Testifying Positively and Budget Outputs
budget support within the same appropriations subsystem so
that variation in the degree to which subsystems support the
cultivation of interest group support will not affect the
analysis,.4 In addition, since all these agencies are in one
department, the effects of differences in departmental budget
procedures and the general policy orientation of the president
and Congress toward the policy area are constant.
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TABLE 3
Intensity of Group Support and Budget Outputs
GROUP SUPPORT AND BUDGET OUTPUTS
Fenno presented evidence that clientele support for a
bureau could lead to high growth in that bureau’s budget.
Table I presents the relationships between the number of
interest groups testifying for each of the bureaus and the two
budget output measures.5 As suggested by Fenno, bureaus
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TABLE 4
Number of Members of Congress Testifying
and Budget Outputs
with strong group support have larger growth rates in con-
gressional appropriations. The bureau’s group support,
however, also has a positive impact on the ability of the
bureau to avoid budget cuts (the success rates). The first table
appears to confirm a portion of Fenno’s predictions on interest
groups and budgets.6
In the methodological sections of this paper, we argued
that the more intense the support for a bureau among its
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TABLE 5
Intensity of Congressional Support and Budget Outcomes
clientele, the greater the impact the clientele would have
on budget outputs. Table 2, which presents the relationship
between the percentage of favorably testifying groups and
budgets outputs, and Table 3, which relates the mean support
scores of the bureau’s clientele to the budget outputs, both
indicate that intensity of support does not influence the
budget process positively. None of the four relationships
are positive and substantively significant.
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In Power of the Purse, Fenno also presents evidence that
indicates congressional support for an agency helps that
agency avoid cuts in its budget (positive congressional
success rates). Although the variable in this study is oper-
ationalized somewhat differently than in Fenno’s original
essay,7 the evidence in Table 4 indicates he was correct.
First, congressional support has a moderate impact on the
congressional growth rate of bureau budgets, a finding not
anticipated by Fenno. More directly, however, a strong rela-
tionship (the strongest found in this paper) exists between
congressional support and large congressional budget success
rates.
Unlike the intensity of clientele support in general, the
intensity of congressional support is related to budget out-
puts (see Table 5). The intensity of congressional support is
moderately related to the congressional growth rate, and
slightly related to the congressional success rate. In each
case the intensity relationships merely reflect the same
relationships between the number of members of Congress
testifying and the budget outputs because the congressional
intensity scores are highly correlated with the number of
congressional witnesses (r = .62).
Given the nature of the budget process and the perspective
of appropriations committee members, we speculated that
certain types of clientele would be more helpful than others.
Table 6 lists the phi coefficients for the relationships between
budget outputs and the distribution of groups testifying for a
bureau. The .10 relationship between members of Congress
and the congressional growth rate, for example, indicates that
bureaus with a larger portion of their support from members
of Congress fare slightly better in maintaining a strong con-
gressional growth rate. Table 6 indicates that with few
exceptions the type of clientele support has little impact on
budget outputs. In both cases bureaus that have a larger
amount of support from peak associations fare worse in the
budget process at all stages. Second, bureaus with a large
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TABLE 6
Phi Coefficients for the Relationship Between Type
of Group and Budget outputsa
a. Sign assigned to phi coefficient based on sign of gamma.
percentage of single petitioners tend to have slightly higher
success rates. The first finding is in line with our hypotheses
because peak associations do not have large memberships
and are not perceived as potent political forces. The second
relationship is spurious; agencies with a large percentage
of single petitioners are also agencies with strong congres-
sional support. fhe success rates are more likely a result of
congressional support rather than the single petitioner
support.
CONCLUSION
This paper has argued for more research on the impact
of external factors on the budget process. In line with that
emphasis, we reexamined some hypotheses first proposed by
Fenno on the impact of interest group support on the budget
success and failure of federal bureaus.
We found that congressional budgeting behavior was
responsive to interest group support for bureaus and their
programs. Strong interest group support (strong in the sense
that many groups supported the bureau) resulted in larger
growth and success rates for the bureau’s budget. Strong
congressional support affected both the bureau’s growth
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rate and its ability to avoid budget cuts. Congressional
support was very strongly related to a bureau’s ability to
avoid cuts in their budget requests to Congress.
The findings are encouraging but not definitive. Finding
that interest group support has some impact on the budget
process supports the contentions of Wildavsky, Fenno,
Rourke, and other students of the political process. Although
the study deals only with Department of Agriculture bureaus
over a short time span, the methods used are easily transfer-
able so that this study can be replicated in other policy sub-
systems and during other time periods. Only when such studies
are completed can a definitive answer be given concerning
the impact of interest groups on the federal budget process.
NOTES
1. This section does not pretend to examine all the literature on budgeting&mdash;that
would be an impossible task in a few pages. Our concern is only with that portion
of the literature concerning interest groups and a small portion of the empirical
literature that we cite as illustrative.
.2. A brief listing of some of the witnesses supporting the Agricultural Research
Service will indicate the range of interests included. They include the National
Woolgrowers, the Society of American Florists, Agway Inc., the North Dakota
Stockmen, the National Wildlife Federation, the National Grange, the National
Farmers Union, the American Farm Bureau Federation, and the Wild Rice Growers,
to name just a few.
3. The bureaus are the Agricultural Research Service, the Animal and Plant
Health Inspection Service, the Statistical Reporting Service, the National Agri-
cultural Library, the Extension Service, the Cooperative State Research Service,
the Economic Research Service, the Packers and Stockyards Administration, the
Farmers Cooperative Service, the Foreign Agricultural Service, the Foreign Assist-
ance Program, the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service, the Federal
Crop Insurance Corporation, the Commodity Credit Corporation, the Rural Devel-
opment Service, the Rural Electrification Administration, the Farm Home Ad-
ministration, the Soil Conservation Service, the Agricultural Marketing Service,
and the Food and Nutrition Service.
4. These criteria mean that the Forest Service, which is part of the Department
of Agriculture but not subject to the Agriculture Appropriations Subcommittee,
was excluded from the analysis. Also excluded from the analysis were the Environ-
mental Protection Agency, the Federal Trade Commission, and the Consumer
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Product Safety Commission that were under the jurisdiction of the Agriculture
Subcommittee for part of the time period under consideration. These agencies were
excluded because they performed fundamentally different functions, and because
they were moved to the jurisdiction of a different appropriations subcommittee in
1975. 
5. The data are presented in 2-by-2 tables to simplify the presentation and because
the extreme values for a few cases make correlations unreliable. The cut points for
the tables are the median values of the variables. The median growth rate for all
agriculture bureaus was 8%; and the median success rate was 5.5% more than the
initial request. Other division points also represent medians. Tables were divided on
the medians to prevent all the bureaus from clustering in one or two cells.
6. Data were presented in aggregated form rather than in yearly figures because a
single year’s budget, especially in an area as rapidly changing as agricultural policy
in the 1970s, is subject to a variety of outside influences totally unrelated to bureau
support or bureau performance. The need to cut back funds for fiscal policy reasons
in the 1970s was reflected in decreases for rural development programs. The Soviet
grain purchases caused a major revamping of the Commodity Exchange Authority
(now Commodity Futures Trading Commission) and its budget. These events plus
the increase in grain prices and the enactment of the 1973 Agriculture and Consumer
Protection Act caused major variations in appropriations from year to year. The
correlations between group support in one year and budget growth in that year ranged
from -.07 to .22; congressional support correlations ranged from -.04 to .44. Only
in the long run do major environmental influences even out so that the impact of
interest groups on budgeting is discernible. Interest group support may not have any
impact in a single year, but with continued support over time (interest group support
is fairly consistent from year to year, r = .78) budgets are affected.
7. Fenno argues that support for the bureau among subcommittee members helps
the agency avoid cuts. The variable we used here is support from members of Congress
in general rather than just subcommittee members. Table 4, therefore, is not a fair
test of Fenno’s hypothesis; but given the fact that the table supports the hypothesis,
we feel the generalizability of the original hypothesis is increased.
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